EUROPEAN SCIENCE FOUNDATION
SETTING SCIENCE AGENDAS FOR EUROPE

Exploratory Workshop Scheme

Standing Committee for Social Sciences (SCSS)

ESF Exploratory Workshop on

The Cognitive Basis of Understanding Social Relations: Developmental, Comparative and Evolutionary Approaches

Inárcs (Hungary), 23-26 June 2010

Convened by:
György Gergely

SCIENTIFIC REPORT

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1. Executive summary

The meeting took place at the Bodrogi Kuria Hotel, in Inárcs (Hungary), over 4 days. Participation numbered 23 scholars, including the representative of the ESF. Attendants originated from 9 countries (England, France, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United States of America). The general atmosphere was collaborative, friendly, and relaxed although the program of the workshop was relatively intense. In addition to the scientific programme, the surroundings permitted plenty of additional informal interaction.

The workshop aimed at bringing together leading researchers from different disciplines who made substantial contributions to the newly emerging domain of social cognitive foundations of the philogenetic origins and ontogenetic determinants of early understanding social relations and groups *('folk social psychology')*. The workshop was designed to provide a forum of discussion and exchange of ideas to generate more clarity and insight by critical reflection into the central issues and future directions of this newly emerging field as well as laying the foundations for future cooperative research.

The workshop increased the communication between the different communities working on human's folk social psychology. The attendants to the workshop contributed to further develop a common scientific culture and terminology serving as a basis for more exchanges between the different disciplines studying humans' folk social psychology. Participants presented original, unpublished data, and recent studies, and put forward provocative hypotheses with the aim of renewing the understanding of human's processing of social relations and groups. This led to highlight several research conclusions, and to define future research directions.

The data and theories presented as the workshop were found to challenge the traditional understanding of humans' social abilities developed in several social sciences. Many of the presenters' works evidenced highly complex social skills in very young human infants and children. Some of the participants presented recent data on infants' capacity to represent and engage in social relationships (such as social dominance, affiliation and ostracism), on the early bases of intergroup-relations, and on the building blocks of morality (such as the understanding of norms, fairness, distributive justice or reciprocity). These early capacities suggest that young children may have more complex cognitive capacities than previously thought. They also indicate that part of humans' abilities to represent social relationships and groups may be subserved by relatively simple mechanisms. Part of humans' capacities were found to be shared with non-human animals (such as some underpinnings of reciprocity), whereas others (e.g. capacities to be fair, to act jointly) seemed to be human specific in many respects. The evolutionary story for human's social abilities and the importance of culture in shaping human's specificities are not fully understood in many cases, and were identified as future research directions.

From an institutional point of view, attendants all agreed on the importance of strengthening pluridisciplinarity in the study of folk social psychology. These scientific considerations were found to be intimately linked to questions of institutional organisation: The multidisciplinary study of human's folk social psychology, which requires expertise spanning the whole spectrum of social sciences, cognitive sciences and biology, can only be implemented at the cross-national level, for lack of sufficient expertise in all the relevant domains in a single

country. Participants defined many ways to increase the efficiency of multidisciplinary studies of human's understanding of relations and groups, ranging from individual practices to institutional arrangements.

2. Scientific content of the event

The workshop investigated the nature, development and evolution of human's capacities to engage in interpersonal and in intergroup social relationships, and to represent them from a third person point of view. A particular emphasis was put on relationships that are found in human and non-human primates (such as friendship, coalitions and dominance), and on some social assessments that may be more human specific (such as moral judgments and trust). Researchers from three broadly defined fields were invited: infant researchers, comparative psychologists, and social scientists.

Each participant was invited to present new and provocative data and theories in key areas of human's understanding of social relations and groups. The event was structured in sessions of two to three short presentations, followed by rounds of discussions lead by scientists invited in advance to prepare questions, highlight correspondences or discrepancies between researches, or launch debates. For each session, invited participants were selected among different disciplines (e.g. from sociology and from developmental psychology), in order to favour a multidisciplinary dialogue. Eight sessions were organised, spanning domains from representations of relations between individuals, groups, and representations of rules and regularities organising these relations, at the interpersonal and cultural level. Below is a detailed report of each of the sessions.

Session 1: Expectations of Reciprocity, and Fairness

The Cognitive Requirements of Primate Reciprocity
Gabriele Schino (Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, Rome, Italy)
Gabriele Schino's intervention targeted the phylogeny of the cognitive underpinnings of reciprocity. He presented a set of data suggesting that non-human primates reciprocate favours, in particular grooming and support within fights. He defined two types of cognitive processes that may account for the existence of reciprocity in non-human primates: one, past-oriented, amounts to built emotional preferences for individuals who have helped you in the past, another one, future-oriented, amounts to help others with the anticipation that they will reciprocate in the future. He suggested that in non-human primates, future-oriented reciprocity is less likely than past-oriented reciprocity.

Fairness and Ingroup Favoritism in Infants and Toddlers
Renée Baillargeon (University of Illinois, Champaign, Illinois)
Renée Baillargeon identified some of the building blocks of human's capacity for reciprocity and fairness. Her talk focused on infants' early developing intuitions about reciprocity and fairness, and on how these interact with group-loyalty. She identified three key principles in infants' developing understanding of morality: reciprocity (matching actions and reactions in valence and magnitude), fairness (dealing fairly with others), in-group loyalty (aiming at maintaining positive interactions within groups). On the basis of original empirical evidence, Renée Baillargeon suggested that these three principles may be mastered by infants from their first to their second year of life. These intuitions may provide infants with a skeleton causal framework allowing them to interpret their social surroundings.

Discussion

Led by Pierre Jacob (Jean Nicod Institute, Paris, France)
In the discussion, it was stressed that reciprocity does not require the existence of cooperation, hence may be present in primates. Conversely, fairness is usually required in deciding how to share the benefits of cooperation, a type of interaction which itself may require the capacity for joint action, and in many cases, the capacity to communicate, two psychological capacities that are likely to be human specific. In relation to this later point, Gabriele Schino stressed that primates are sometimes found to be averse to "unfairness" when they receive less that they should do, but have never when they receive more. Some of the participants raised the importance of specifying the cognitive mechanisms allowing reciprocating favours on the basis of past events: capacities to identify others, to form preferences for them, to develop dispositions to act in certain ways with them… Other participants wondered whether the different mechanisms allowing to be moral, to be fair, or to reciprocate overlap: Should fairness and reciprocity be treated as independent principles, or can we say that to reciprocate is but one of the many ways to be fair? Can a general harm principle (aiming at avoiding interfering with individuals' psychological welfare) act as an underpinning for a sense of fairness?

Session 2 : Acting Together, Cooperative Interactions, and Affiliation

How Joint are the Joint Actions of Chimpanzees?

Josep Call (Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig, Germany)

Chimpanzees, our closest primate relative, are sometimes observed acting together, when uniting in a coalition against an opponent, or in some instances of hunting. In his presentation, Josep Call discussed whether chimpanzees have the cognitive capacities required to act jointly. In a series of experiment, he showed that chimpanzees can coordinate to get food. However, they seemed strikingly unable to appreciate the complementary role of a partner when it differed from their own. Moreover, they appeared to prefer solving problems on their own than in collaboration with a partner. Altogether, these experiments outlined some of the specific capacities allowing humans to engage in joint actions, and in collaboration: capacities to represent people's goals, roles, and a motivation to do things with others.

Acting Together: The Reality of We

Natalie Sebanz (Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands)

In contrast with non-human primates, who seem to act jointly with others in only a very limited set of circumstances, humans may have a strong disposition to engage in joint action. Nathalie Sebanz illustrated this tendency by focusing on cases in which humans' cognitive systems cannot help but be influenced by what others do. She studied our drive to take into account what others do in four domains: perceptual relations, attentional relations, observed-attentional relations, and intergroup relations.

Discussion

Led by György Gergely (Cognitive Development Center, Budapest, Hungary)

In the discussion, the cognitive requirements for joint action were further discussed: to what extent does joint action require representing that the same goal is shared by several individual? Is common knowledge or mutual manifestness of others' goals necessary for joint actions? How about social roles? It is sometimes suggested that even chimpanzees maintain stable social roles when hunting socially: one acts as a chaser, the other as an ambusher, and so on. But do chimpanzees represent social roles? And when does this capacity appear in human's ontogeny and phylogeny?

Session 3: Domain-Specificity in the Understanding of Social Relations

To What Extent Can We Speak of a Social Grammar?

Fabrice Clément (Chaire des sciences de la communication et le de l'information, Geneva, Switzerland)

Laurence Kaufmann (Institute of social sciences, Lausanne, Switzerland)

Fabrice Clément and Laurence Kaufmann suggested distinguishing two types of cognitive mechanisms that may be used to interpret the social world: a naïve psychology, or theory of mind, allowing to represent the psychological states of others (e.g. beliefs, desires, goals), and a naïve sociology, allowing to represent the social relations between people, and their social roles. They suggested that humans' naïve sociology should be more ancient from an ontogenetic and phylogenetic point of view than humans' naïve psychology. On the basis of original empirical evidence, they concluded that naïve sociology and naive psychology are indeed underpinned by relatively independent cognitive mechanisms.

Human Infants' Concept of Social Dominance

Olivier Mascaro (Cognitive Development Center, Budapest, Hungary)

Olivier Mascaro provided evidence for infants' capacity to represent social dominance, defined as the capacity to prevail when someone's goals conflict with the ones of others. He suggested that infants' representation of social dominance has three key characteristics. First they permit drawing inferences going beyond what is perceived, and thus may be tagged as "conceptual". Second, they may be rooted in naïve psychology (the capacity to represent other's goals), without being reducible to it (because they include reference to stable social roles). Third, infants seemed to represent dominance as a social relation between agents, and not as an individual trait. Because of these three characteristics Olivier Mascaro concluded that infants' representations of social dominance may be best described as a part of infants' naïve sociology.

Discussion

Led by Ernö Teglas (Cognitive Development Center, Budapest, Hungary)

In the following discussion, some participants questioned the content of infants' naïve sociology: for example, is infants' representation of social dominance limited to the capacity to prevail when agents' goals conflict? Or does it include more information (e.g. expectations of certain obligations or of certain privileges)? The difference between humans' and primates' naïve sociology was also discussed, stressing in particular the role of institutions in shaping human's sociological expectations. Part of the discussion also revolved around the importance of the capacity to track other's mental states: how far can naïve sociology go without appealing to agents' mental states? What is the minimal understanding of action necessary for representing social relations, or social roles?

Session 4: The Functions of Imitation

Innovation not Imitation: When Social Learning is not Enough

Nathan Emery (Queen Mary University, London, United Kingdom)

Nathan Emery reviewed a series of situation in which corvids learn from others, in particular using others to locate food. He also showed some evidence suggesting that corvids can sometimes imitate, and that these imitations may serve an affiliative function. However, Nathan Emery emphasized that when it comes to learn about how to use objects or how to solve problems, corvids rely very little on social learning. On the basis of original data, Nathan Emery

suggested that corvids often do not have to imitate others to learn how to solve a problem, because they are themselves very good innovators, capable of rapid individual learning.

Selective Imitation in Different Social Contexts

Ildikó Király (ELTE Eotvos Loran University, Budapest, Hungary)

In her presentation, Ildiko Kiraly disentangled the roles of the affiliative and epistemic functions of imitation in early childhood. Presenting infants with situations in which they had to learn a novel action from a demonstrator, she investigated the effect of social context to probe the depth of infants' understanding of imitation situations, manipulating in particular the presence of the model, and whether or not she attempted at communicating with the child.

Imitation as a Way of Affiliating and Identifying with Others
Malinda Carpenter (Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig, Germany)

Malinda Carpenter suggested that imitation may serve an affiliative function from an early age. She backed up this claim with a series of experimental studies. She found that infants imitate more opaque actions by people who speak their own language. Moreover, infants seem to see imitation as a way to affiliate with others. First, after having been imitated, 18-month-olds are more likely to help others, although this increased helping is not specific to the person who imitated the child. Children also appear to selectively learn more from the person who imitated them. Second, when primed with ostracism, children tend to imitate more irrelevant actions, possibly as a way to enhance affiliation.

Discussion

Led by Tanya Behne (Georg-Elias-Müller Institute of Psychology, Göttingen, Germany)

The definition of imitation was discussed. The role of communication in imitation was also questioned: to what extent does overt communication is necessary for imitation to perform its affiliative functions? For the imitation of opaque actions to take place?

Session 5: Social Identity, In-groups and Out-groups

Ingroup Loyalty and Reciprocity in Infants and Toddlers
Renée Baillargeon (University of Illinois, Champain, Illinois)

In her presentation, Renée Baillargeon focused on the origins of the processes aiming at maintaining positive interaction within groups. First, she studied cognitive mechanisms that permit to engage in social pretense, in order for example to be polite. Second she focused on the capacity to qualify expectations of reciprocity depending on group membership. According to Renée Baillargeon, reaction to negative acts should be of lower magnitude when the negative act is performed by an in-group, in order to maintain positive interaction within groups. Thirdly she investigated the building blocks of the tendency to retaliate against people who harm member of one's group. On the basis of her studies, Renée Baillargeon suggested that expectations of politeness and of in-group loyalty are present in human children from the second to the third year of life.

The Discriminating Baby
Karen Wynn (Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut)

Karen Wynn suggested that babies have an early developing preparedness to understand groups and affiliation. First, she focused on the role of similarities as a source of affiliation in infancy. Using a methodology which infants have to perform a manual choice between two puppets, she showed that by their first year of life, infants appear to prefer agents who have food preferences that are comparable to their own. Infants also expected agents who have

similar preferences to their own to be more likely to be helped and less likely to be hindered than agents who have dissimilar preferences. Second, Karen Wynn turned to the role of interactions as a cue for affiliation. She suggested that by the age of eleven-month-old, infants expect an agent A who interacted positively with B to retaliate against C after C interacted negatively with B.

Discussion

Led by Gil Disendruck (Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan, Israel)

In the discussion, part of the questions revolved around the nature of the social group that are targeted in the researches of Renée Baillargeon and Karen Wynn: Kins? Friendship? Categorisation in kinds of agents? Categorisation in ethnic groups? The capacity of infants to distinguish between these different kinds of "grouping" of agents was identified as a target for future researches. Some questions targeted the ontogenetic and evolutionary factors that would explain the very early development of infants' capacity to track social groups.

Session 6: Affiliative and Prosocial Behaviours

The Cognition of Couple Cooperation
Nathan Emery (Queen Mary University, London, United Kingdom)

Nathan Emery stressed that engaging in long-term relationships, such as forming and maintaining couples, requires specific cognitive abilities. He provided evidence for certain behaviours found in couple of corvids: bond forming (on the basis of food exchange), increased social attention devoted to one's partner, increased reactivity to one's partner calls, and higher social tolerance (which may favour cooperative problems solving within couples). Nathan Emery suggested that couple relationships may favour the development and evolution of certain cognitive capacities, and illustrated this in the domain of social learning, and of the representation of others' mental states.

Affiliation and its Consequences for Prosocial Behavior and Identification
Malinda Carpenter (Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig, Germany)

Malinda Carpenter presented data suggesting that young children are sensitive to cues signalling affiliation. On the basis of original data, she suggested that 19-month-olds expect people who greet each others to be "friends", and expect people to help their friends when in distress. Young children were also found to be sensitive to signals signalling the belonging to a group. Malinda Capenter was able to show that suggest a preferential helping of in-group members. The imitative behaviour of three-year-olds was also found to be affected by minimal group manipulations. Overall, Malinda Carpenter suggested that her data indicates an early sensitivity to signals of affiliation.

Discussion

Led by Agnes Kovács (Cognitive Development Center, Budapest, Hungary)

The nature and complexity of the mechanisms allowing for affiliation identification were discussed. From a very young age, children appear to be sensitive to arbitrary signals to identify affiliation relationships (e.g. wearing a sticker of the same or of a different colour than someone else). Is this capacity found in non-human animals? Would animals with a complex social life, such as corvids or chimpanzees for example, show the same capacity? The way affiliation is to be defined and understood in young children, or in animal species, was also discussed. For example, in non-human primates, there are different ways to be affiliated with others: belonging to a particular group, but also belonging to a particular matriline within a

group. Could any of these capacities have served as a basis for the human capacity to represent relations between groups?

Session 7: Norms and Conventions

That's the Way We Do It:

Children's Assumptions about the Conventionality of Culture

Gil Disendruck (Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan, Israel)

In his presentation Gil Diesendruck focused on how children learn about the cultural information and about the convention of the group they belong to. On the basis of original experimental data, he evidenced some capacity in children to identify conventional or culturally relative information, and to selectively learn this information from the members of their group.

The Early Development of Normativity

Hannes Rakoczy (Georg-Elias-Müller Institute of Psychology, Göttingen, Germany)

In his presentation, Hannes Rakoczy distinguished two kinds of normativity: one for the mind-to-world relations (beliefs, or assertions), and the other for the world-to-mind relations (desire, or imperatives). Hannes Rakoczy presented data suggesting that infants can distinguish these two types of normative relations by the age of three-year-old, but not at two-year-old. A similar developmental pattern is found in the processing of other normative types of normative assessments, such as understanding ownership rights.

Discussion

Led by Gergely Csibra (Cognitive Development Center, Budapest, Hungary)

Part of the discussion was devoted to distinguish rules from regularities. How do children and adults determine the difference between the two? What kind of information is crucial for establishing both rules and regularities: statistical learning? Social information conveyed by communication? Whether children understood various rules and conventions as constitutive or as regulative rules was also discussed.

Session 8: Moral Evaluation and Punishment

Judging Accidental Harm

Pierre Jacob (Jean Nicod Institute, Paris, France)

In his presentation, Pierre Jacob focused on how adult manage to qualify the moral evaluation of perpetrators of harmful actions. He targeted the interplay between moral reasoning and the capacity to represent others' intentions, drawing two kinds of distinctions: whether harm occurred or not, and whether harm was intended or not. He argued that accidental harm is a case of genuine moral dilemma, because it requires exculpating an agent who did harm by using information about her mental states. On the basis of infants, adults and psychiatric data, he identified some of the cognitive requirements allowing humans to deal with such a dilemma, in particular executive resources.

Young Children's Behavior Towards Victims and Perpetrators

Amrisha Vaish (Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig, Germany)

Amrisha Vaish infants' and children's moral reasoning from a third party point of view, in situations in which their self-interest cannot bias their responses. First, she focused on children's reactions to transgressions. From the age of three-year-old, children showed concern about the destructions of token who mattered for someone else. Three-year-olds also tended to

act less prosocially towards perpetrators of morally questionable acts. However, children did not reduce their helping if the perpetrator of the morally questionable act did not intend to do so. Second, Amrisha Vaish targeted mechanisms that can qualify the moral assessment of a transgressor, once a transgression has taken place, such as guilt displays. From the age of 4- to 5-year-old, children appeared to be sensitive to displays of guilt.

The Moral Baby

Karen Wynn (Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut)

Karen Wynn presented data on infants' early evaluation of actions, and actors in terms of valence (positive or negative), that may serve as an underpinning for the development of moral cognition. On the basis of her data, Karen Wynn outlined a developmental agenda for the development of valence assessments. Three-month-olds were found to assign negative valence to hinderers. At 5-month-old, infants also assigned positive valence to characters that helped others. At 8-month-olds, on the other hand, this tendency was qualified by who the patient helping was. Infants appeared to prefer agents who harmed agents who harmed others before, rather than agents who helped agents who harmed others before. In their second year of life, infants also showed some capacity to identify with helpers, or to hinder themselves agents who hindered others.

Discussion

Led by Dan Sperber (Jean Nicod Institute, Paris, France)

Participants' questions focused on the capacity to revise moral judgements: Karen Wynn's presentation suggested that infants may form moral judgement quickly, on the basis of a single act. Nonetheless, as stressed in Pierre Jacob's and in Amrisha Vaish's presentation, the capacity to exculpate agents may consume important cognitive resources, and may in some cases develop relatively late in the preschool years. When is it easy to revise moral judgements? Why is it so consuming to revise certain kinds of moral judgements? What are the limits to flexibility of infants' moral judgments? The nature of infants', and children's assessment was also discussed: Do infants, children, or even adults keep track of the causes that lead them to assign valence to a person, or to an action? If no, could this explain part of people's difficulty to revise their moral judgements? Another set of questions focused on moral development: since infants and preschoolers appear to have very early developing moral intuitions, what can be said to develop in moral cognition. In particular, how is culturally relative moral knowledge acquired by young children?

3. Assessment of the results, contribution to the future direction of the field, outcome

The main advance of the workshop was to break new ground in the study of human's and animals' folk social psychology. During the workshop, it appeared gradually that many of the extremely systematic and provocative participants' empirical researches required developing new theoretical models, or achieving better integration what has already been discovered by comparative, developmental and social psychologists, philosophers, and social scientists.

One of the contributions of the workshop was to raise challenges for various models of cognitive development, by suggesting that infants may have much more sophisticated cognitive abilities than previously thought, at least in the social domain. Many of the presenters provided compelling evidence suggesting that in their two first years of life, infants can identify and track agents, attribute traits and valences to particular people and actions, form and revise preferences, represent one's community, perform complex moral assessments... Some of the results presented were not only impressive in their precocity,

but also in their strength and systematicity, suggesting that very strong intuitions and preferences underpin human infants' folk social psychology. How these strong intuitions fit with, or challenge what we know of children and adults understanding of social relations and groups was identified as a future research direction.

The workshop also challenged some of the underlying assumptions of traditional models of humans' understanding of social relations. In particular, it highlighted the importance of thinking of deflationist models to account for humans' representation of social relations. Non-human primates or very young infants' capacities to represent complex interpersonal and group relations questioned the role of cognitive abilities that are sometimes thought of as necessary for understanding the social world, such as language, or the representation of others' mental states. Future researches will be needed to determine how far simple cognitive models can go in the explanation of human's and animals' folk social psychology.

Both the animals' and the infants' data suggested that much of folk social psychology is shaped to a great extent by evolution. This called into question the role of culture or socialization as shaping fully or almost fully our understanding of the social world, or of social relations, which is often dominant in social psychology, sociology or anthropology. Nonetheless, culture has a crucial role to play in human's understanding of social relations, and an important question for future research is to redefine its contribution to the shaping of human's naïve folk social psychology. How communication, social roles, institutions, interact with the capacities evidenced throughout the workshop remains to be understood. Additionally, the workshop attracted the attention of participants on the opportunity for discovering the cognitive underpinnings of complex social objects, traditionally studied by social sciences: norms, morality, social roles, or institutions.

Because of the multifaceted nature of the workshop's theme, many questions about multiplidisciplinarity were discussed. Some of the participants outlined that a simple step for improving future research would be to find ways to interact more with scientists from social sciences: social psychology, sociology, philosophy, or anthropology. How to bring together researchers from different disciplines to work on folk social psychology in the most fruitful way was also discussed, first locally, in contexts similar to the workshop itself, and then more generally, in the context of collaborations between individuals, research groups, and institutions. Participants defined several ways to develop an institutional platform for bringing together researchers interested in the domain of folk social psychology such as developing a journal, or an online research institute. Lastly, questions about how to build transnational cooperative networks were also raised, in particular on how to reinforce cooperation between American and European researchers on the study of folk social psychology.

4. Final programme

Thursday 23 June 2011

Morning- Early Afternoon	*Arrival to the Cognitive Development Center*
	Buffet Lunch at the Center
16.00-17.00	*Bus to the hotel*
18.00-18.15	**Welcome Address**
	György Gergely (Central European University)
18.15-18.30	**Presentation of the European Science Foundation (ESF)** **Eva Hoogland** (ESF Standing Committee for Social Sciences, Strasbourg, France)

Friday 24 June 2011

9.00-10.30	**Morning Session 1: Expectations of Reciprocity, and Fairness**
9.00-9.30	**The Cognitive Requirements of Primate Reciprocity** **Gabriele Schino** (Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, Rome, Italy)
9.30-10.00	**Fairness and Ingroup Favoritism in Infants and Toddlers** **Renée Baillargeon** (University of Illinois, Champaign, Illinois)
10.00-10.30	**Discussion**
	Led by Pierre Jacob (Jean Nicod Institute, Paris, France)
10.30-11.00	*Coffee / tea break*
11.00-12.30	**Morning Session 2 : Acting Together, Cooperative Interactions, and Affiliation**
11.00-11.30	**How Joint are the Joint Actions of Chimpanzees?** **Josep Call** (Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig, Germany)
11.30-12.00	**Acting Together: The Reality of We** **Natalie Sebanz** (Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands)
12.00-12.30	**Discussion** **Led by György Gergely** (Cognitive Development Center, Budapest, Hungary)
12.30-14.00	*Lunch*
14.00-15.30	**Afternoon Session 1: Domain-Specificity in the Understanding of Social Relations**
14.00-14.30	**To What Extent Can We Speak of a Social Grammar?** **Fabrice Clément** (Chaire des sciences de la communication et le de l'information, Geneva, Switzerland)
	Laurence Kaufmann (Institute of social sciences, Lausanne, Switzerland)
14.30-15.00	**Human Infants' Concept of Social Dominance** **Olivier Mascaro** (Cognitive Development Center, Budapest, Hungary)
15.00-15.30	**Discussion**
	Led by Ernö Teglas (Cognitive Development Center, Budapest, Hungary)
15.30-17.00	*Bogrács gulyás : cooking together*
17.00-17.30	*Coffee / tea break*

17.30-19.30	**Afternoon Session 2: The Functions of Imitation**
17.30-18.00	**Innovation not Imitation: When Social Learning is not Enough** **Nathan Emery** (Queen Mary University, London, United Kingdom)
18.00-18.30	**Selective Imitation in Different Social Contexts** **Ildikó Király** (ELTE Eotvos Loran University, Budapest, Hungary)
18.30-19.00	**Imitation as a Way of Affiliating and Identifying with Others** **Malinda Carpenter** (Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig, Germany)
19.00-19.30	**Discussion** **Led by Tanya Behne** (Georg-Elias-Müller Institute of Psychology, Göttingen, Germany)
From 20.00	*Bogrács gulyás party*

Saturday 25 June 2011

9.00-10.30	**Morning Session 1: Social Identity, In-groups and Out-groups**
9.00-9.30	**Ingroup Loyalty and Reciprocity in Infants and Toddlers** **Renée Baillargeon** (University of Illinois, Champain, Illinois)
9.30-10.00	**The Discriminating Baby** **Karen Wynn** (Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut)
10.00-10.30	**Discussion** **Led by Gil Disendruck** (Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan, Israel)
10.30-11.00	*Coffee / tea break*
11.00-12.30	**Morning Session 2: Affiliative and Prosocial Behaviours**
11.00-11.30	**The Cognition of Couple Cooperation** **Nathan Emery** (Queen Mary University, London, United Kingdom)
11.30-12.00	**Affiliation and its Consequences for Prosocial Behavior and Identification** **Malinda Carpenter** (Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig, Germany)
12.00-12.30	**Discussion** **Led by Agnes Kovács** (Cognitive Development Center, Budapest, Hungary)
12.30-15.00	*Lunch*
15.00-16.30	**Afternoon Session 1: Norms and Conventions**
15.00-15.30	**That's the Way We Do It:** **Children's Assumptions about the Conventionality of Culture** **Gil Disendruck** (Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan, Israel)
15.30-16.00	**The Early Development of Normativity** **Hannes Rakoczy** (Georg-Elias-Müller Institute of Psychology, Göttingen, Germany)
16.00-16.30	**Discussion** **Led by Gergely Csibra** (Cognitive Development Center, Budapest, Hungary)
16.30-17.00	*Coffee / tea break*
17.00-19.00	**Afternoon Session 2: Moral Evaluation and Punishment**
17.00-17.30	**Judging Accidental Harm** **Pierre Jacob** (Jean Nicod Institute, Paris, France)

17.30-18.00	**Young Children's Behavior Towards Victims and Perpetrators** **Amrisha Vaish** (Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig, Germany)
18.00-18.30	**The Moral Baby** **Karen Wynn** (Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut)
18.30-19.00	**Discussion** **Led by Dan Sperber** (Jean Nicod Institute, Paris, France)
20.00	*Dinner*

Sunday 26 June 2011

09.30-11.00	**Planning of future research**
12.00	*End of Workshop and departure*

5. Statistical information on participants

Age bracket: 28-70

Countries of origin

COUNTRY	NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS
England	2
France	3
Germany	5
Hungary	6
Israel	1
Italy	1
Netherlands	1
Switzerland	2
United States of America	2

M/F repartition: 11 women and 12 men.

Repartition by scientific specialty

SCIENTIFIC SPECIALTY	NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS
Comparative Psychology	3
Developmental Psychology	13
Neuro-Imagery	1
Philosophy	2
Psychology	1
Social Sciences	2

6. Final list of participants

Note that three participants could not join the workshop: Dale Hay and Lotte Thomsen had to cancel their participation for health reasons. Alessandra Geraci could not participate because of unexpected professional appointments.

Convenor:

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