

ESF Exploratory Workshop on

The Future of Representative Democracy

Scientific Report

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Executive Summary

The aim of this workshop was to explore the future of representative democracy. In recent years, an increasing number of analysts have claimed that the mechanisms of representation that lie at the heart of existing democracies are afflicted with problems. There has always been a gap between the ideals of representative democracy and its actually existing forms. Some observers draw from this the conclusion that expressions of dissatisfaction with representative democracy are normal, even healthy reminders of the precious contingency of a form of government that has no other serious competitors. According to other observers, euphoria about representative government is unwarranted. The mechanisms of representation that lie at the heart of actually existing democracies are said to be afflicted with problems. These observers claim that such difficulties are nurturing public concerns about the future of representative democracy itself. In democratic systems as different as the United States, India, Germany, Great Britain, Argentina and Australia, these observers point to evidence of a creeping malaise: formal membership of political parties has dipped; voter turnout at elections is tending to become more volatile; levels of trust in politicians and government are generally in decline; public perceptions of the deformation of policy making by private power, above all by organised business interests, are rising. When considered together, these disparate trends have encouraged some analysts and citizens to draw the conclusion that the system of representative democracy is breeding political disaffection. Others have argued that the ideals of representative democracy are themselves now under siege, even that we are heading towards an epoch of ‘post-democracy’. How plausible are these claims about the decline or decay or disappearance of representative democracy? This workshop has addressed such claims by re-examining the past, present and future of the ideals and institutions of representative democracy.

The workshop has put together fifteen scholars, coming from six European countries, East and West, as well as from the United States. They have all worked extensively on different aspects of representative democracy from diverse fields such as political theory, comparative politics, electoral studies, and gender politics. The manuscripts discussed varied widely in terms of methodology: there were quantitative and qualitative papers, theoretical and empirical ones.

Scientific content of the event

One of the first questions that were raised during the debate was the need to specify better what exactly we are talking about: democracy, representation, or both? Clearly, democracy and representation are two different things, with well established and independent historical developments. Democracy originated with the ancient Greeks, although as a practise it was probably much older than that. Athenian democracy was direct and participatory, and highly restricted to a few (foreigners, slaves and women were excluded from the *demos*). Representation as a political idea and practise emerged only in the early modern period and had nothing to do with democracy. The alliance between democracy and representation did not take place until the great democratic revolutions of the late eighteenth century and the extension of the suffrage. For some, representative democracy meant a way of limiting the democratic impulse and controlling the lower classes. For others, it was the diminished version of the Greek ideal of direct democracy and the only way in which democracy could be put into practise in large nation-states. Thus, going back to the initial question, the workshop agreed that we should discuss the *relationship between representation and democracy*; or, in other words, the analysis of *democratic representation* in present day *representative democracies*. It was not the focus of the workshop to discuss the meanings and practises of representation outside the realm of democratic government or the different forms that democracy may adopt besides representative forms. However, it was part of the discussion the analysis of: a) forms of democratic politics and b) forms of representation (beyond the exclusively electoral one), that might fill in the gaps to be found in existing representative democracies.

Conventional accounts about the relationship between representation and democracy take for granted that representative democracy is mainly about elections and elected officials and that the only political community that matters in terms of political representation is the territory demarcated by the nation-state. The empirical expression of representative democracy in the world now is *party democracy* or *parliamentary democracy*, depending on where the accent is put. Political parties and parliaments are not exclusive features of democracies. They embody the institutionalisation of political representation and, as such, they can also be found in dictatorships and hybrid regimes (political representation, we insist, is not exclusive of democracies). However, in combination with democratic government, that is, with the sovereignty of the people, they constitute the institutional core of existing representative democracies. Simply put, the difference between parties

and parliaments in democracy and in dictatorship is that, in the former, elections are inclusive, free, competitive and meaningful whereas in the latter they are not.

The assumption behind the expectation that representative government serves the cause of democratic government is that free elections lead to meaningful elections and these, in turn, lead to good representation. It was more or less clear from the discussion that electoral representation does not necessarily lead to good representation. Why is it necessary to re-evaluate our assumption that political representation serves the cause of democratic government? To which extent our present forms of representative government actually serve democracy? There are various ways in which this assumption is unrealistic and/or wrong. But before turning to them, it is necessary to discuss two questions that are prior to the concrete institutionalisation of representative democracy and that, although belonging to an exclusively normative sphere in which different visions of what is good face one another, have clear empirical implications/expressions: first, different visions of citizenship and, second, different visions of democracy:

(a) Visions of citizenship: who should belong to the *demos*?

The alliance between democracy and representation developed, from the very beginning, within a given state territory which, in the context of the great democratic and industrial revolutions, developed, simultaneously, into a nation-state. The extent to which this alliance could work letting loose of a particular territory, across territories and/or beyond them, was not deeply discussed during the workshop, though everybody agreed that we should abandon the straitjacket conception of political representation and democracy only in territorial terms. Representative democracy occurs within a given territory but membership in the political community does not come automatically from the fact of being physically present in this territory. As Seyla Benhabib writes “[t]he modern nation-state system has regulated membership in terms of one principal category: national citizenship” (2004: 1). As a consequence, “[o]n a global scale, citizenship is an immensely powerful instrument of social closure” (Brubaker, 2004: 141). The establishment of a representative democracy requires, for its functioning, a prior decision concerning membership in the *demos* or, in other words, a decision about who can become a national citizen and what criteria ought to determine this. Not everybody can belong to the *demos*; not everybody can be a citizen. What does a person need to do in order to become a citizen? According to the territorial vision of citizenship (*ius solis*), it is enough to be born within the territory of the *demos*. According to an ethnic vision of citizenship (*ius sanguinis*), it is necessary to be born of people that belong to the *demos*.

These visions of citizenship have immense implications for the type of representative democracy that will be established.

The criteria for inclusion also need to decide upon immigrants. People that are in the territory temporally, as tourists, visitors, on business trips, etc., should not be considered citizens with rights of representation and participation in the government of the state. This is clear to almost everyone. But, what about those immigrants who come into a state to stay? Should they be excluded from membership? If they are, who would represent them and how? The decision about who belongs to the *demos* has pressing consequences for the quality of representative democracies in a world in which migration has become a global phenomenon. Can we leave the criteria of membership in the hands of historical contingency? Is it not this the cause of so many undemocratic practises in existing representative democracies today?

The membership in the *demos* has also another side. The problem of migration is that of a person who, not belonging to the *demos*, would like to belong to it. Simultaneously, there is also the challenge of those who, belonging to the *demos*, do not want to belong to it but would rather belong to other *demos*, differently defined and conceived. When a person is given a particular membership by default, i.e. by the natural fact of being born into the territory that defines such membership, but the person does not feel part of the political community so defined, this person will not feel represented by the state institutions. This is at the origin of many separatist and irredentist conflicts in today's democracies and representative democracy has yet to find a "democratic" way to respond to this challenge.

(b) Visions of democracy: whose will is sovereign, the will of the majority or the will of as many as possible?

As one of the participants has put it during the workshop, "the two different visions of democracy aim at different forms of representation. The proportional vision of democracy prioritizes the representation of as many as possible. The majority-control vision gives pre-eminence to the representation of the majority. The institutional provisions for both forms differ. The proportional vision is institutionalized by a proportional electoral system, which allows the electoral success even when the vote share is small. The vision of the majoritarian model is institutionalized by a majority electoral system, normally with single-member districts. Candidates must win the majority (or plurality) of the vote" (Wessels, 2007: 10-11) The majority vision does not allow the electoral success of the small. Which "vision" is more conducive to democratic

governance? Which vision is more conducive to “good” representation? Is it possible to combine in one system representative and democratic governance? Each vision of democracy presents representative democracies with different challenges. When the will of the majority is sovereign, there is danger of the tyranny of the majority, so brilliantly analyzed by Tocqueville. As one of the participants has put it in a recent publication: “If the minority still finds itself repeatedly in the minority or its voice is not given the chance to be heard and its claims advocated, it might start using and seeing the idea of the general will in quite a different way. In the least dramatic scenario, this would be the crisis of representativity, of a fracture within sovereignty (...). In the most dramatic one, this would be a revolutionary break” (Urbinati 2006: 136). On the other hand, when the priority is given to the will of as many as possible, the tyranny of the minority may emerge. The inclusion of the small at all costs may give them a power of disruption, blockage or veto that does not correspond with their number in the political community.

After considering these prior questions, we can now turn to discuss to what extent present-day representative governments actually serve democracy. In which sense can we say that there is a crisis of democratic representation? Although the answer to this question was not unanimous, there was a conviction, shared by most participants, that the relationship between democracy and representation is under a lot of strain and that there seems to be moving in the direction, pointed out by Hannah Pitkin, of representation supplanting democracy instead of serving it: “Our governors have become a self-perpetuating elite that rules – or rather, administers – passive or privatized masses of people. The representatives act not as agents of the people but simply instead of them” (2004: 339).

As we will see next, some of the problems that representative democracies are facing are intrinsic to the logic of representation and others afflict directly the main institutions of representation, namely parties and parliaments. There is little new about these problems. In one way or another, they are as old as the hybrid of representative democracy. The real novelty is that they have gained intensity and scope during the last decades, due, first, to some recent developments, such as economic and political globalization, global-scale migrations (especially immigration into democratic states), technological and communications revolutions, and second, to the generalisation and/or intensification of old ones, such as ethnic conflict, religious extremism, humanitarian crises, poverty and social inequality, and terrorism.

What are the main problems and challenges that representative democracies are facing today?

1. Political disaffection and declining trust in democratic institutions and in politicians.
2. Electoral turnout is low or very low. Elections are perceived to perform very poorly. Elections are not a sufficient instrument of control over representatives by citizens. Electoral laws are constantly manipulated in order to favour or guarantee a particular outcome. In some electoral systems, electoral practises are used in electoral constituencies in order to empty them of a real choice. Are elections an effective way of making elected officials accountable? Is democratic representation possible without electoral participation? As one participant has put it, many of these problems (corruption, little accountability, disproportionality, and the like) can be ameliorated through institutional improvements. However, there is also the possibility that elections alone are not a sufficient provision to produce representation. If this is the case (although we need further research before we can arrive to such conclusion), the democratization of democracies beyond elections has to be put on the agenda (Wessels, 2007: 21).
3. Citizens are ill-informed about the activities of the government and of their representatives.
4. Democratic deficit at the international/supranational level: inadequate democratic credentials of new and existing international organizations. Can democracy be realized beyond the nation-state?
5. Elected populism is growing. Trade-off between responsibility and responsiveness
6. Extremism, especially religious and ethnic extremism, is spreading.
7. The unchecked power of undemocratic organisations, such as national and international mafias and trans-national corporations is growing.
8. The corrupted role of money in elections is alarming. There is an increasingly large and distorting influence of private business on public policy.
9. The crisis of political parties: parties find it increasingly difficult to attract citizens. Membership figures have dropped. Corruption in party finance is ubiquitous. Cartel

parties are involved in a corrosive effort to keep out other political parties from electoral competition. Given this dismal reality, how necessary are parties for the functioning of representative democracy? Can representative democracy work without parties? There was no agreement among participants in this respect. For some, representative democracy is party democracy. According to these participants, parties are an intrinsic part of the process of representation, understood as both delegation and advocacy. The existence of parties is what makes representation a collective act, and not a dyadic one as in the personalized model. Political deliberation, a constitutive part of the act of representation, is unavoidably partisan. For others, representative democracy existed before parties, which are a relatively new invention, and it would be worth exploring the possibility of a democracy without parties. This is in fact happening in some places, albeit at the local level.

10. The crisis of legislatures: parliaments are highly discredited in the eyes of the citizenry. Traditionally, parliaments collectively as institutions have rarely enjoyed a particularly high or positive public profile. However, as one of the participants has claimed during the workshop, “there are other factors we can point to which have recently become more pronounced and which have contributed to a decline in public confidence or esteem (...) [A] decline can be traced, on the one hand, to the erosion of representative and accountability functions with a high public salience; on the other, to parliament’s association with aspects of politics that have become increasingly unpopular, not to say discreditable, in the public mind” (Beetham, 2007: 2) such as extreme partisanship (in the sense of sectarianism) and “money politics”. The conclusion we can derive from this is not that parliaments are no longer important. A representative democracy without parliaments would be an “unacceptably thin version of democracy, in which the citizen was constructed largely as an individual consumer of public services, not as a potentially active partner in a collective democratic process, and in which there was no continuous or vigorous public debate and contestation about key collective choices facing the society” (Beetham, 2007: 5). Therefore, we need to reinvent parliaments in ways that have not been yet envisaged. New forms of participation for engaging citizens in politics that bypass the parliament are not enough to avoid the alienation of the public from parliament and can, in fact, contribute to it.

11. Degrees of representativity: the democratic value of equality. In societies as heterogeneous as modern societies are, in terms of gender, race, ethnic and cultural background, wealth, sexual orientation, religious denomination, etc. there is a clamor from below to make space for the equal participation of all and for the representation of

all. There are different normative visions of how to represent heterogeneity (descriptive representation versus substantive representation) and different visions of democratic equality (equality of opportunity versus equality of result) with clear empirical implications. Representative democracies are now fully engaged in the discussion of these issues and new forms of representation and participation of minorities will need to be developed in the future in order to further democratize our societies.

How spread is the crisis?

Some of the participants in the workshop mentioned that we should look more carefully into the differences between regions of the world, between the new democracies of the developing world and the old (or older) democracies of the developed one, in order to see to what extent the crisis has been generalized to all existing democracies. The discussion at the workshop was mainly focused on Western established democracies.

What is the future of representative democracy?

Most participants in the workshop agreed that much can be learned about the novelty of our times by revisiting the early modern origins of representative democracy (Keane, 2007:2), especially now that representative democracy is torn to pieces between utopian demands and functional reality (von Beyme, 2007: 22). Is direct democracy the solution? As Klaus von Beyme rightly pointed out, there is a stubborn believe that direct democracy is not a question of *whether* it should be organized, but only *how* it can be implemented. However, empirically oriented scholars have tried to see whether “direct democracy and legislation via referenda with a deliberative discourse” is really better and more efficient. The results were discouraging for direct democracy: “no Habermasian power-free discourse has been discovered. The results of referenda were mostly middle class and status quo-oriented. Radical groups or even semi-leftist groups, such as trade-unions, normally failed to gain anything from popular legislation” (Von Beyme, 2007: 23).

From a normative point of view, the debates about the future of representative democracy are still discussing about what is bad, what is good and what is better. For many in the workshop, representative democracy is the first-best option and the direct-representative distinction should be avoided given that representation is a ubiquitous phenomenon and even direct democracy involves acts of representation (Saward, 2007: 8). The question,

however, remains: Is it possible to arrive at a common vision of representation, democracy, of citizenship, of equality, which is, for all, the good one? Is it desirable?

From an institutional point of view, several ideas for the future were raised during the discussion. First of all, the idea of complementing elections with “something else” was discussed. What this “something else” might be is still not clear, but it should involve more direct participation of citizens in political deliberation and decision-making, including “non-elective representative claims by citizens” who are “free to advocate, organise, lobby and to claim to stand for, or to speak for, interests broader than their own” (Saward, 2007: 8). This type of direct participation is clearly more feasible at the local level.

Second, the idea of saving parliaments and parties from their present crisis was debated. Most participants agree that representative democracy cannot function without them and that it is necessary to engage in institutional reforms and innovations. In this respect, the need to reform party finance was particularly emphasized. Several institutional innovations were suggested and discussed. There were, however, some voices claiming that we should at least consider the possibility of cutting representative democracy loose from political parties. According to Schmitter, some of the functions traditionally attributed to political parties, such as the organization of elections, are already being performed outside political parties. Parties are not necessary to form governments. Party people are less and less prominent in the formation of governments. Should we really care about the crisis of parties? In response to this, others emphasized new functions that political parties have been acquiring during the last decades, such as that of gatekeepers of elected positions and their decisive role in including or excluding under-represented groups in politics (Dahlerup, 2007: 87). In this respect, parties still have a very important role to play in making participation more inclusive.

Third, the need to find institutional responses to the challenge of migration and membership was also recognised although concrete measures were not debated.

Four, it was widely admitted that representative democracy was more than ever before pressed to respond to the demands for equal participation. In this respect, the familiar opposition between the camps of “equality of opportunity” and “equality of result” was not completely overcome, although one of the participants demonstrated that institutional mechanisms such as the gender quota regime, “contrary to what is commonly believed among both quota opponents and quota advocates- is just a step towards providing real

equality of opportunity rather than equality of result”. The conclusion was that this type of institutional mechanism restricts mainly the freedom of local party organizations: “The main effect of properly implemented quota systems is that they make the political parties start recruiting women in a serious way” (Dahlerup, 2007: 88).

Finally, two new developments connected with the territorial basis of representative democracy were discussed: representation beyond the nation-state and representation within the “multinational nation-state”. With respect to the former, we have entered a new age of denationalization in international politics and institutions. One of the participants defended that, “if, for the effectiveness of an international institution, an institutional design is required that comprises quasi-judicial dispute settlement bodies, independent monitoring bodies and international agents for the collection and distribution of knowledge, then there will be an increased share of supranational and transnational features in international institutions. These institutions are not any more mere agents of democratically elected governments” (Zürn, 2007: 2). However, when it comes to the supranational and transnational regulation of denationalized issues, the modes of representation are still heavily unbalanced in favour of territorially organized representation through elected executives and sectoral organized representation through interest groups (lobbying).

Representation within the “multinational nation-state” is also moving in new directions. Modern representative democracies must find a way to represent a multinational society. It was widely admitted by most participants that in present day democracies, minority nationalisms, their organizations (cultural movements and political parties) and supporters (nationalist party activists and nationalist voters), represent a fundamental challenge to the nation-state. It is not, however, a claim to go back into the past. In its maximalist version, minority nationalists seek their own states within -and not outside- the framework of supranational structures, such as the European Union. This version sticks to the old idea that every nation must have a state and, therefore, does not represent, in any fundamental way, a new form of nationalism. In its pragmatic version, short of outright independence, minority nationalists are willing to accommodate themselves into flexible, ever changeable, multinational state forms. This version represents a break with the ideas of the past and goes beyond the old principle that every nation is entitled to its own state. Under this version, the self-determination of peoples does not require independent statehood; it can take place within the existing state. In order to face this new challenge, representative democracies in multinational states must accept their intrinsic provisionality: the constitutional identity of society is always provisional, representative claims are always contested and contestable. This is the main

characteristic of a free and democratic society, that it is involved in a continuous process of discussion. A multinational representative democracy, therefore, is not a democratic way to solve, once and for ever, nationalist claims; it is a democratic way of dealing with them now and in the future. Constitutionalism, however, sets boundaries and limits on the *demos*. What the representatives of minority nations are demanding is a tolerant attitude towards constitutional changes, if they are necessary for the further development of the multinational state. Representative democracies, therefore, must find a way towards a more flexible relationship between the rule of law and democracy. In the words of one participant: “nothing is definitive in a political deliberation scenario whose presumption of legal changeability is its constitutive component” (Urbinati, 2007: 27).

Assessment of the results, contribution to the future direction of the field, outcome

Steps to be taken by the convenors and the participants in the aftermath of the workshop:

1. The convenors will distribute among the participants a report about the results of the workshop.
2. The convenors will use the report and the initial book outline as a baseline from which to produce a limited set of questions to be answered by all contributors in their papers and which should help in providing a high degree of coherence to the book (J. Haslam, CUP). These questions will be distributed among the participants with a petition to receive feedback so that the convenors may add, modify, revise, or cancel single questions.
3. Each participant will re-write their contributions in light of this set of questions and will distribute the revised manuscript among all the other participants.
4. Book meeting in Lisbon at the end of 2008.

Book proposal, as it is now:

The main objective of this book is to reconsider the well-known claim by Tocqueville that one of the great virtues of democracy is that it makes ‘retrievable mistakes’. The contributors to this edited volume will discuss whether, in matters of representation, Tocqueville’s insight still applies to actually existing democracies. The “glue” that links the chapters together will be a future-oriented focus on how political representation can

best serve democracy or, in other words, how the institutions of representation can be reformed in order to make true what, at this point, is at best a desideratum: the true sovereignty of the people. This question lies at the cutting-edge of contemporary political debates and research, and will form the core of a volume that we believe can make a distinctive contribution to the trajectory of research in the social and political sciences.

All book contributions must focus on the relationship between representation and democracy with these questions in mind: to what extent does political representation serve the cause of democracy today? What can be done in order to make present-day political representation more democratic? In order to answer to these questions, all contributions must contain a diagnosis of the present situation (be it empirical, in existing democracies; or theoretical and/or normative, in existing debates) and a discussion of future tendencies and/or possible solutions.

Preliminary book structure into chapters:

Part 1: Relationship between Representation and Democracy: Origins - Historicity - Definitions – Problems

1. **Rethinking the Origins and Future of Representative Democracy** (John Keane, Center for the Study of Democracy and Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung)

Sketching the political disaffection bred by modern representative democracy as a point of departure, this contribution seeks to explore the current shapes and performance of representative democracy around the world, the new forms of ‘post-Westminster’ or ‘monitory’ democracy and their implications for representative democracy’s future. This is done through examining the medieval and early modern origins of the concept of representation while keeping in mind the various trends (normative, semantic, deliberation theories) in current scholarship, synthesizing and broadening them. The introduction distinguishes between representation as semblance and representation as substitution. It also presents late 18th century justifications of representative government. The scope is cosmopolitan, looking further than representative democracy’s European birthplace, while its inevitability is not taken for granted. The fusion of representation with democracy in the 18th century is instead seen as a result of a constant struggle against ruling groups and various power conflicts; some of the forms it acquired when transplanted in non-Atlantic regions are

examined in depth. Finally, the challenges to representative democracy as they are set by state and cross-border developments and the institutional innovations these put in place are presented.

2. Democracy on Trial: On Some Recent Conceptions of Political Deliberation (Nadia Urbinati, Columbia University)

The chapter focuses on recent attempts (Rosanvallon, Pettit) to depoliticize deliberation. According to the author, depoliticized deliberation is used as a way of containing democracy by extending the domain of non political practices encouraging, thus, “an impolitical rendering of democracy”. In the case of Rosanvallon, contemporary democracy is read in the negative, “as an uninterrupted dynamic of the reactions of civil society to the actions by the institutional political society”. Civil society does not express its distrust and / or dissatisfaction through the standard representative practices, such as elections, but instead through the media, civil associations, movements etc, aiming at the subversion of the legal and political order peacefully and without destabilizing it. Rosanvallon calls this dynamic of defiance ‘counter-politics or ‘counter democracy’. This “negative sovereignty” exercised by the citizen takes the ‘impolitical’ forms of ‘impediment, surveillance and judgment’ (e.g. movements, NGOs, media, courts, markets) and is seen in positive light since it is considered to be a barrier against populism. Similarly, but following a different path, Pettit’s vision involves “a narrowing down of the political dimension (democracy) while expanding deliberation and adversarial practices”. In these “politics of passion”, parliaments’ role is limited to a final assent on proposals deliberated by commissions of experts while contestatory practices have to follow legal avenues. Therefore, the creation of more deliberative bodies and contestatory practices will be necessary with Pettit arguing that “contestability” is not a democratic strategy but instead inherited by the republican tradition of constitutional discussions. The chapter presents a historical view of the scholarship on deliberation and concludes by questioning the trends presented, attributing to them the danger of displacing politics, narrowing its realms and scope. Referring to Weber’s view of bureaucracy and the judiciary, the author also doubts that ‘counter-democracy’ forms can be proven more impartial guardians of law and people's interests than the elected representatives.

3. **The Meanings of Representation** (Michael Saward, Open University)

The chapter addresses representation not viewed strictly under the prism of the electoral procedure and parties. It instead embraces a more dynamic and flexible face of representative politics involving new forms of non-elective representation as these result from the decline of parties and voting participation. Before getting into any detail, the chapter examines the nuances and categories of representation historically, with the latter being identified with monarchs and aristocrats in opposition to 'direct democracy' at least up to the American and French revolutions. It is only after the second transformation of democracy that the two signifiers, democracy and representation come close. Similarly today, the chapter argues, there is another shift in the meaning of 'representation' affecting the main *étant données* of the theory of representative democracy: centrality of elections, of the nation-state and the relation between elected representatives and constituents. Drawing from Jane Mansbridge's new categories of representation and other studies regarding the variety, contingency and dynamism of both electoral and non – electoral representation forms, Saward concludes that representation becomes a 'complex' one and remains a democratic necessity, 'the first-best option'. This 'complex representation' should be taken into account and its dynamics and shape should be institutionally explored.

Part 2: Contemporary problems in representative democracies: diagnosis and possible solutions

4. **The Present Forms of Representative Democracy** (Klaus von Beyme, Institut für Politische Wissenschaft, University of Heidelberg)

After briefly looking at parliamentarism's evolution in different European countries in the last two centuries, the chapter attempts to set a list of the theoretical and ideological conflicts concerning representative forms of government: defects of early representative democracies; dissatisfaction and ensuing populist tendencies in consolidated representative democracies and normative theories' suggestions of 'reform' and 'transformation' by projecting visions of republicanism, deliberative, reflexive democracy and other. It then examines old and contemporary forms of 'defective' democracies referring to seminal scholars (Mill, Burke, Schumpeter, Pitkin) while attempting to set a taxonomy of European hybrid democracies that stand between liberal and 'defective' democracies. Populism is explored in depth as a challenge to representative democracy and practical examples of its appearance in

Europe are pinpointed. Finally, an attempt to present a list of 'neo-normative' models of representative democracy is made and their inter-conflicting and / or utopian character is accentuated.

5. Performance and Deficits of Present-day Representation (Bernhard Weßels, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung)

Focusing on party and electoral politics as the main characteristics of representation, the chapter presents a comparative study of electoral systems with regards to voters' satisfaction and feeling of being represented. These studies show a huge variation in the perception of elections as conducive to representation among countries with well or less good established democracies and provide a complex view of the factors affecting citizens' feeling of representation. Furthermore, the chapter examines the impact of majoritarian and proportional voting systems on representation and on how the latter is perceived by the citizenry (as partisan and personalised respectively). It also looks at how they affect policy representation with the representatives being in the first case more oriented towards the 'median voter' while the representatives under proportional system tending to be more strongly oriented towards their party voters. Despite the "poor performance of elections", the chapter concludes that this doesn't prevent citizenry from feeling represented, that institutions do matter and that representation through the standard institutional framework remains the main factor of political legitimacy.

6. How to Improve the Performance of Political Parties ... and Why Bother? (Philippe Schmitter, Central European University and European University Institute)

Despite political parties' necessity and the apparent impossibility that they will ever eclipse, the chapter argues that if they are seen against the role and goals they are supposed to fulfil (organising elections; forming governments; running legislatures; holding rulers accountable), parties are found to have declined in their functional capacity. The author supports this decrease by referring to existing party corruption; parties becoming less prominent according to opinion survey data; legislations without deliberation or deriving straight from the executive; gerrymandering and other problems affecting parties. In addition, non-party elections can take on some municipal and other levels; the left-right continuum, under which they fall, no longer correspond to the cleavages that voters would like to be offered; and there is a decline

in party membership and trust which, to an extent, has to do with the public funding changing the relationship between parties and the need of networking. By focusing on party finance and possible amendments to it (mainly through limiting state funding), the chapter suggests that parties' performance will be thus invigorated, intra-party democracy will increase and parties will seek to involve a greater number of citizens. Other measures (NOTA voting, discretionary and smart voting) are also suggested.

7. The Future of Parliaments (David Beetham, University of Leeds and International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assessment)

The chapter examines the role of parliaments in contemporary representative democracy and it finds that the impact of increasingly depoliticized, media-driven societies has placed them at the bottom of the list of institutions with regards to the level of citizen confidence or esteem. Parliaments have no collective identity but are instead associated in the public mind with parties and governments, being attributed, thus, all the negative features of the latter. Subsequently, the chapter looks at efforts undertaken by parliaments to address these issues and to achieve democratic reform in the context of an Inter-Parliamentary Union's working programme. These efforts involve the implementation of measures to improve social, ethnic and gender representation along with efforts to communicate better with the electorates and to involve younger people, interested individuals and groups in the parliamentary procedures. Regulating the funding of political parties is also seen as a way to restore public confidence in them, elections and parliamentary integrity. The chapter finally examines new forms of citizen participation and representation (citizens' juries, deliberative forums, co-governance innovations, referenda and other) stressing their importance but also highlighting that they will indeed contribute and not corrode further the public trust in the classic institutional framework only if the latter incorporates them into the established representative process.

8. Engendering Representation (Drude Dahlerup, University of Stockholm)

The chapter briefly examines key concepts in women's political representation. It mainly discusses the argument for the need to include different experiences and interests (of women and other underrepresented groups) along with arguments for modernization and democratic legitimacy. The chapter also considers that gender quotas have succeeded in combining both social representation and representation of ideas. It then moves on to study the different forms of gender quotas, their

implications and their variations across countries, regions, different political and electoral systems, variations often neglected by both quotas' opponents and proponents. The nature and role of gender quotas are then seen in relation to two different concepts of equality: equality of opportunity and equality of result. While the former is considered as the liberal type of equality par excellence, the latter is characterized by liberals as an unfair equal redistribution of goods and values. The chapter argues that gender quotas constitute a step toward providing real equality of opportunity rather than equality of result. Finally, they influence party organizations by making them recruit women while they overall increase electoral competition.

9. Multinational States: Threat or Opportunity for Representative Democracy?
(Sonia Alonso, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung)

The chapter studies the relationship between representative democracy and minority nationalisms in the nation-state, differentiating the latter from state nationalism. Focusing on the Spanish case but also looking at the examples of Great Britain, Belgium, and other European countries, the chapter examines the emergence of stronger national autonomies in western democracies as a factor leading to the creation of multinational states. The chapter argues that the organisations of minority nationalisms (such as cultural movements and political parties) along with their supporters (activists, voters) and their demands of privileges, greater autonomy or even outright independence in some cases constitute a challenge to the nation state. Transcripts of Spanish parliamentary debates concerning the reforms of regional constitutions of the Basque Country, Catalonia and Andalusia and other survey data concerning national identities in the Spanish regions are used to prove the point. The chapter considers that representative democracy is the only political form with available space for more than one national identity so democratic representation in such states will bring to an end the (based on a singular national identity) nation-state.

10. Representation beyond the Nation-State (Michael Zürn, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin and Hertie School of Governance)

The chapter examines the forms that representation can take outside the borders of a nation-State. It begins by examining the necessary institutional designing components of an international organisation so that the latter is effective: quasi-judicial dispute settlement bodies; independent monitoring bodies; and international agents for the collection and distribution of knowledge. These institutions are not mere agents of

democratically elected governments and therefore, they will attribute supranational and transnational characteristics to the international body within which they exist. The chapter goes on to compare new and old international institutions of representation, their regulatory problems and corresponding institutional solutions. The chapter also defines six modes of representation. These are defined, on a first level, according to their type of organisation (i.e. territorial, sectoral, individual) and on a second level, according to the type of actor/ action, aggregation of interests and locus of deliberation. It is argued that these modes of representation are usually balanced within a well-ordered democracy. By contrast, these modes are out of balance beyond the borders of nation-states and when they attempt to engage in supranational regulations of denationalised issues.

Part 3: Future of Representative Democracy: prospects and new forms of representation (other substantive themes for possible inclusion)

11. The Universality of the Western Model

12. Media and Democracy

13. Time-bound and future oriented representation

14. Conclusion: the Quality of Representative Democracy (Wolfgang Merkel, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin and Humboldt Universität. Sonia Alonso, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung)

Rough time schedule for the production of the book:

	Editors	Contributors
February 2008	<p>Feb 6: Meeting in WZB Berlin.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Feedback on contributions. - Outline of the book; suggestions for further collaborations. - Planning ahead: publishing and next meeting <p>Feb 15:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Contact with old and potential new collaborators. - Provide them with feedback, current book outline and overall summary. (MF) 	

March 2008	Wk of March 3: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Approaching John Haslam at CUP with the book outline 	First week March: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Feedback received Deadline for the next draft set for May 15 th , 2008
April 2008 – Sept 2008	May 16- June 20: Assessment and feedback on contributions. June 30: Finalisation of meeting details in Lisbon First wk of July: Invitations sent out	May 15: Delivery of contributions
Oct 2008	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Meeting in Lisbon (exact date tbc) - Finalisation of publishing details 	Meeting in Lisbon (exact date tbc)
Nov 2008 – Sept 2009	Nov 08: report on meeting and further action to be taken (amendment on chapters etc) Dec 08- Feb 09: Index, Proof-Reading, Copy-editing	

Final Programme

Thursday 13 December 2007

morning

Arrival

14:00-14:15

Welcome

Wolfgang Merkel, (*Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), DE*)

Introduction

14:15-14:45

Rethinking the Origins of Representative Government

John Keane, (*Centre for the Study of Democracy, London, UK and WZB, Berlin, DE*)

14:45-15:15

Discussion

15:15-15:45

The Present Forms of Representative Democracy

Klaus von Beyme, (*Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg, DE*)

15:45-16:15

Discussion

16:15-16:30

Coffee break

First Session

16:30-17:00

Performance and Deficits of Present-day Representation

Bernhard Weßels, (*Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), DE*)

17:00-17:30

Discussion

17:30-18:00

How to Improve the Performance of Political Parties... and Why Bother?

Philippe Schmitter, (*Central European University, Budapest, HU*)

18:00-18:30

Discussion

19:00

Dinner at WZB

Friday 14 December 2007

Second Session

- 09:00-09:30 **Do Parliaments Have a Future?**
David Beetham, (*University of Essex, UK*)
- 09:30-10:00 **Discussion**
- 10:00-10:30 **Democracy on Trial: On Some Recent Conceptions of Political
Deliberation**
Nadia Urbinati, (*Columbia University, New York, US*)
- 10:30-11:00 **Discussion**
- 11:15-11:30 *Coffee break*
- 11:30-12:00 **Multinational Democracies: A Challenge to Representative
Democracy?**
Sonia Alonso, (*Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung
(WZB), DE*)
- 12:00-12:30 **Discussion**
- 12:30-13:00 **Engendering Representation**
Drude Dahlerup, (*Stockholms Universitet, SE*)
- 13:00-13:30 **Discussion**
- 13:30-14:30 *Lunch at WZB*

Second Session, continued

- 14:30-15:00 **Representation and Democracy: Revisions and Possibilities**
Michael Saward, (*Open University, Milton Keynes, UK*)
- 15:15-15:30 **Discussion**
- 15:30-16:00 **Representation beyond the Nation-State**
Michael Zürn, (*Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung
(WZB), DE*)
- 16:00-16:30 **Discussion**

16:30-17:00

Coffee break

17:00-17:30

Concluding Remarks and Follow-up Research Activities

John Keane

17:30-19:30

Discussion: edited book

20:30

Dinner (Café Einstein, Kurfürstenstr. 58, 10785 Berlin)

Saturday 15 December 2007

Departure

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Statistical Information on Participants

1. Geographical distribution (based on country of work)

Country	Number of participants
Croatia	1
Germany	13
Hungary/Italy	1
Slovakia	1
Sweden	1
United Kingdom	5
United States	1
Spain	1

2. Age distribution (by brackets)

25-35	9
35-45	3
45-55	7
55-65	2
+65	2

3. Gender distribution

Female	Male
10	14