

## Trust, Reputation, Defectors, and Sustaining Social Norms: Studying spatially complex cooperative relationships in ways that connect TECT projects

**Programme: TECT Networking Workshop** 26-29 March 2008

Hosted by the University of Porto





EUROCORES Programme





FCT Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia MINISTÉRIO DA CIÊNCIA E DO ENSINO SUPERIOR Portugal

## **Timetable of Events**

## Wednesday, 26 March

#### Morning/early afternoon

Participants arrive and check-in

## Late afternoon/early evening

- 5:00 Opening session (The Dean of the University of Porto or representative; the Director of the Faculty of Arts or representative) Welcome, introductions, and aims (the workshop organizers: Amélia Polónia and Jack Owens
- 5:30 Brief summaries of the CRPs, with emphasis on the workshop themes:

Adrian de Froment, representing of SENSE PI Daniel Rubenstein; SOCCOP AP Luca Tummolini (representing Cristiano Castelfranchi), AP Gennaro di Tosto (representing Rosaria Conte); DynCoopNet PL Ana Crespo Solana

- 6.45 Instructions about logistics and reimbursement
- 7:00 Break for dinner

## Thursday, 27 March

## Morning

[Two morning sessions to inform the discussions in later sessions]

## 9:00 Reputation and Social Norms: Letter-writing and information distribution

#### **Presenters:**

Margrit Schulte Beerbühl (Non-TECT; University of Düsseldorf): Spatial construction and social norms in eighteenth-century trade networks

Gennaro Di Tosto (SOCCOP): Social psychology of reputation and the maintenance of social norms

Amélia Polónia, Hilario Casado Alonso, and Amândio Barros (DynCoopNet): The reputation and the maintenance of social norms among merchants: the Simón Ruiz case. Presentation of a research project

Ricardo Court (DynCoopNet): Sustaining reputation through the language of trust

10:45 Coffee Break

# 11:15 Trust, Reputation, Group Augmentation, and Network Flexibility (continuation of the first session)

#### **Presenters:**

Luca Tummolini (SOCCOP): Trust as a social relationship: Basic ingredients

Sara T. Nalle (DynCoopNet): Partner choice and merchant mobility: Preliminary results

Myriam Senn (DynCoopNet): Standard-setting by regulatory networks: The case of financial services

**Discussants:** Participants will include David Alonso García, Nuno Camarinhas, Joaquim Carvalho (DynCoopNet), Adrian de Froment (SENSE)

1:00 Break for lunch

## Afternoon

## 3:00 Cheaters and Defectors in Global Trading Networks

**Speaker and discussion leader:** Adrian de Froment, representing Daniel Rubenstein (SENSE), will explain the current state of thought about the role of "cheaters & defectors" for understanding and modeling cooperation. He will then lead the discussion of the implications of pre-circulated compilations of data by DynCoopNet members of manifestations of cheating and defection in the commercial networks of the first global age. The object is one or more joint publications.

DynCoopNet members are producing compilations of data in response to queries posed by Jack Owens as a result of his meeting with Dan Rubenstein during the Stockholm workshop in September 2007 (see ANNEX A).

**Data compilations:** David Alonso García, Cátia Antunes, Hilario Casado Alonso, Ana Crespo Solana, Juan Gelabert González, Vicente Montojo, Rila Mukherjee, Jack Owens, Antoni Picazo, Amélia Polónia da Silva, Jessica Roitman

4:15 Coffee Break

#### 4:45 Group Augmentation and the Thought of Hanna Kokko

**Discussion leader:** Jack Owens (DynCoopNet): Group Augmentation as an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS)

As a result of discussions with Hanna Kokko (REPSOCBIOL), Jack Owens requested that DynCoopNet members who were able to do so should submit compilations of

data, which will be circulated among participants prior to the meeting, in response to a series of queries he posed (see ANNEX B).

**Presentation:** Jessica Roitman (DynCoopNet): Group augmentation among the Sephardim: Significant innovation of the first global age?

**Discussants:** Participants include Amândio Barros, Joaquim Carvalho, Sara T. Nalle, Myriam Senn (DynCoopNet), Adrian de Froment (SENSE), Gennaro Di Tosto and Luca Tummolini (SOCCOP), Margrit Schulte Beerbühl (Non-TECT)

6:00 Break for social program/ dinner

#### Friday, 28 March

#### Morning

#### 9:00 Modelling from Economic and Ecological Data from the First Global Age

#### **Presenters:**

Jack Owens (DynCoopNet): What kind of system is it?

Emery Coppola & Derrick Sharp (DynCoopNet): Modelling the commercial networks of the first global age: Some preliminary results (Sharp will discuss some work being done by the Geographically-Integrated History Laboratory of Idaho State University on weather patterns and network disruptions at sea; Coppola will discuss artificial neural networks –ANNs-- and their use for understanding the dynamics of commercial networks)

**Discussants:** Shahriar Yousefi, participating historians and geographic information scientists, Myriam Senn (DynCoopNet), Adrian de Froment (SENSE), Gennaro Di Tosto and Luca Tummolini (SOCCOP), Margrit Schulte Beerbühl (Non-TECT)

10:45 Coffee Break

#### 11:15 Temporal GIS, Space-Time Representation of Cooperation Networks, Spatio-temporal Analysis, and Data Mining

Presenters and discussion leaders: May Yuan (DynCoopNet)

**Presentation:** Ian Johnson (DynCoopNet): *Time*Map (www.timemap.net)

**Discussants:** Miguel Bernabé, Emery Coppola, Miguel Nogueira, Daniel Orellana, Jack Owens, Antoni Picazo, Myriam Senn, Derrick Sharp, Shahriar Yousefi (DynCoopNet)

1:00 Break for lunch

#### Afternoon

#### 3:00 Maps as Sources of Historic Data

#### **Presenter**:

Antoni Picazo (DynCoopNet): GIS, historic cartography, and the evaluation of the subjective spatial perception of the Indian Ocean and "South Sea"

Luis Moreira (Non-TECT): Observing one's country through maps of others: Portuguese cartography by Tomás López

**Discussants:** Miguel Bernabé, Ian Johnson, Miguel Nogueira, Daniel Orellana, Jack Owens, Derrick Sharp, May Yuan (DynCoopNet)

- 4:15 Coffee Break
- 4:45 **Plenary: Joint publication, data sharing, future research directions** Led by Gennaro di Tosto, Luca Tummolini, Jack Owens, and Adrian de Froment
- 6:00 Break for social program / dinner

#### Saturday, 29 March

#### Morning

- 9:00 **Meeting of the DynCoopNet collaborative research community** Led by Ana Crespo Solana
- 12:30 Break for lunch

#### Afternoon

14:00 Cultural visit to Vila do Conde - an historic seaport, exemplar of self-organizing dynamics in the First Global Age (1400-1800)

ANNEX: The tasks for collaborative work on cheaters and defectors and on group augmentation

## A) Cheaters and Defectors in Global Trading Networks

DynCoopNet members are producing compilations of data, indicating the **location** of events, in response to queries posed by Jack Owens as a result of his meeting with Dan Rubenstein during the Stockholm workshop in September 2007. Researchers will expose:

1) Evidence of "defections" where **some party refuses to do business**. Particularly valuable will be examples of documents in which it is stated why a party "defected" (for example, some problem with the reputation of the rejected merchant). Also, we will want to learn about the impact of this decision to defect, both for the party who defected and the party who lost a desired collaborator.

2) Evidence of **violent attacks on merchant vessels** by others who operated as merchants. This is also a form of "defection" because the attacker has refused to cooperate. Of course, this would include piracy tied to a commercial operation such as slave markets or the redemption of captives in North Africa and to European violence disrupting the patters of commerce in non-European regions. Again, we are interested in the event and its circumstances and in the impact of the event.

3) Evidence of any sort of **compensation payment**, including by officials of Crown or municipal governments

4) Evidence of **lawsuits** for breach of contract or other breakdowns of commercial relations

5) Evidence of any other type of break with the expectation of cooperation in commercial or financial relations

Goal: We want to understand what **alternatives to cooperation** were available to long-distance traders.

## **B)** Reputation, Group Augmentation, and Network Flexibility

As a result of discussions with Hanna Kokko, Jack Owens requested that DynCoopNet members who were able to do so should submit compilations of data, which will be circulated among participants prior to the meeting, in response to a series of queries he posed:

The idea here is that "superior mutualistic performance of cooperatively behaving groups" (Kokko et al, 2001) provided an ESS (Evolutionarily Stable Strategy). Markers of such superior performance might be greater flexibility to respond quickly to opportunities created by a treaty arrangement or disruptions created by war or epidemic disease, or it might involve some sort of spatial expansion of member merchants' markets and product suppliers.

If you think you see manifestations of such group augmentation, ask yourself:

On what did recruitment depend? What mechanisms existed to promote cooperation? What were the requirements for each of these mechanisms to operate?

What enhanced recruitment? For example, do you see a role for material display of any kind? How did **helping** enhance recruitment?

What encouraged the geographic dispersion of the group, and what were the consequences of such dispersion? Think, for example, in terms of Genoese or Milanese merchants establishing themselves in the Iberian Peninsula. What did this dispersal do to their **partner choice** for family formation and commercial relationships? Did such relationships expand the group's activities in ways beyond the obvious **spatial** consequences?

What might the maximum group size have been? For example, think of the problems of **distance and time** as ecological constraints.

Look for merchants serving as uncompensated agents for others, especially others in another, distant location. This is especially interesting if the acting individuals have no **guarantee** of a future payback.

Consider cases where the reduced performance of shrinking groups produced group extinction.

What aspects of the group and its norms reduced the incidence of **cheating** and **defection** and stabilized **help levels**?

What happened to "cheaters"? Were they rejected by group members? Was their economic success reduced? Did they disappear from long-distance trade, perhaps retaining a local trading position?

How did group interactions manifest themselves for the individual actors over their life histories?

To what extent did recruitment for group augmentation depend on the **spatial awareness** of merchant-traders, merchant-financiers, and merchant-bankers (not distinct categories)?

Compared to what individuals actually did, what alternatives were really available to them?